Clausal Equations (A Note on the Connectivity Problem) by Schlenker, Philippe
Clausal Equations (A Note on the Connectivity
Problem)
Philippe Schlenker
To cite this version:
Philippe Schlenker. Clausal Equations (A Note on the Connectivity Problem). To appear,
Natural Language & Linguistic Theory. 2002. <ijn 00000287>
HAL Id: ijn 00000287
http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn 00000287
Submitted on 7 Nov 2002
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Clausal Equations (A Note on the Connectivity Problem)*
Philippe Schlenker
Abstract: According to a variety of tests, What John likes is himself displays the same c-command relations as
John likes himself. But none of these relations appears to hold on the surface; this is the 'connectivity problem'.
Revisionists maintain that the problematic examples are identity sentences with no hidden structure, but that
none of our c-command tests is infallible. Conservatives claim that our c-command tests are reliable, but that the
clause John likes himself is indeed present at some level of representation. Siding with the Conservatives, we
follow Ross's original insight and suggest that connectivity sentences equate a concealed question with an elided
answer: [What John likes]= [John likes himself].  New arguments are given for each component of the analysis,
and it is shown that connectivity effects are obviated when the elements that are equated are referential rather
than clausal. The correct truth-conditions are derived from the semantics of identity, together with Groenendijk
& Stokhof's semantics for questions. The analysis is then extended to cases of DP connectivity, such as His
worry is himself, by suggesting that semantically dyadic nouns have an additional argument position, yielding
the representation: [?x his [worry x]]=[his [worry himself]]. Finally it is shown that recent objections based on
'anti-connectivity' effects misfire, because the same facts hold of question-answer pairs, as is expected on the
present approach.
0 Introduction
The riddle of Pseudocleft Connectivity1, which has exercised linguists for the last thirty
years (see Akmajian 1970, Ross 1972, Higgins 1976), has been the object of renewed
attention in the recent past (Guéron 1992, Heycock & Kroch 1999, Sharvit 1999, Den
Dikken, et al. 2000, and Ross 2000). The reason is probably that the problem can be seen as
foundational, since one side of the debate (one I will oppose) maintains that the relevant facts
argue for a revision of the very bases of syntactic theory. Briefly, the initial puzzle was that,
according to a variety of syntactic tests, a sentence like (1)a should display the same c-
command relations as the ‘connected’ sentence in (1)b2:
(1) a. What John likes is himself
b. John likes himself.
Principle A of the Binding Theory states that ‘himself’ in (1)a should be c-commanded
locally by ‘John’, just as it is in (1)b. The problem is that this does not appear to be the case,
at least if (1)a has a structure similar to (2):
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1
 Also called ‘connectedness’.  I use the term ‘connectivity’ to avoid confusion with an unrelated proposal by  R.
Kayne.
2
 The statement of the puzzle will be refined below, especially when we discuss (a) connectivity effects with
noun phrases, and (b) anti-connectivity.
2(2) 
what is
         John likes  t            himself
Thus the problem is that there is a discrepancy between the apparent structure of (1)a and the
structure it should have according to various c-command tests - in fact, according to all of the
syntactician’s standard c-command tests.  For simplicity, I will call ‘connectivity sentence’
any copular sentence that exhibits these properties (thus I will assume that, by definition, all
c-command tests converge in this way in a ‘connectivity’ sentence)3.
Two main lines of research have been explored so far: the revisionist approach
(Jacobson 1994, Sharvit 1999, Cecchetto 2000, 2001) suggests that (1)a is a simple identity
sentence, and that its apparent structure is the real one. The connectivity puzzle simply shows
that none of our c-command tests is infallible.  This, of course, requires a new account of
binding and scope, one that does not always depend on c-command - hence a far-reaching
revision of the foundations of the field.  By contrast, the conservative approach retains at
least some of our c-command tests, but argues that despite appearances the sentence in (1)a
does contain, at some level of representation, a connected clause like (1)b. Among
conservative approaches, the 'Question in Disguise Theory'4 argues that (1)a is a question-
answer pair, where part of the answer is elided (Ross 1972, 1985, 1997, Schlenker 1998, Den
Dikken et al.  2000):
(3) [What John likes __] is [John likes himself].
I provide new arguments (partly from French) in favor of a conservative approach
along the lines of the Question in Disguise Theory. However I disagree with other proponents
of the Question in Disguise theory such as Den Dikken et al. 2000 in maintaining (as
Revisionists do) that connectivity sentences are a variety of identity sentences. Thus I argue
that in a connectivity sentence the verb be has the meaning of identity, but that the elements
that are equated are a question and an answer, rather than referential elements or other
higher-order semantic objects. In other words, on the present theory a connectivity sentence
is an  equation of two clauses:  a concealed question and an elided answer.
 There are two main challenges for this theory. The first is to derive the semantics of
the construction. In classic accounts such as Hamblin 1973 or Karttunen 1977 a question is
3analyzed as a set of (true or possible) answers. But this immediately entails that a question
could not be equated to an answer without yielding a type mismatch. However, the situation
is different on Groenendijk & Stokhof's theory (e.g. Groenendijk et al. 1997), whose claim is
precisely that the extension of a question Q is simply the intension of the unique exhaustive
answer to Q.  Thus a question can be equated with an answer; I show that this derives the
right truth-conditions for our construction. The second challenge is to extend the Question in
Disguise Theory to cases of DP connectivity, as in (4):
(4) Hisi worry is himselfi
Principle A suggests that ‘his’ c-commands ‘himself’ locally, something which is not
apparent on the surface.  Accordingly, I extend the analysis to DPs, and argue that whenever
connectivity effects arise the DP has an additional argument position and can be interpreted
as a clause5. Thus (4) is given the analysis in (5), where a concealed question is equated with
an elided answer (‘?x’ is the question operator, and 'worry' is analyzed as a dyadic predicate):
(5) ?x [his [worry x]] = [his [worry himself]]
The paper is organized as follows.  First, I lay out the major challenges for the
Question in Disguise theory and its rivals. Second, I give new arguments to motivate each
component of the proposed analysis: the pre-copular element is a question, the post-copular is
an elided answer, and be means identity. Third, I show that the semantics of the construction
can be  derived from Groenendijk & Stokhof's analysis of questions. Fourth, the analysis is
extended to cases of DP connectivity. Finally, I review cases of 'anti-connectivity' used
against the present theory by proponents of the revisionist approach, and show that despite
appearances these facts strengthen the empirical basis of the Question in Disguise theory.
1 Revisionist and Conservative Approaches
1.1 The initial generalization: Pseudocleft Connectivity
The initial generalization shows that all standard c-command tests yield the same
results with pseudoclefts and with their ‘connected’ counterparts.  (The following English
facts can be replicated in French, with the proviso that the pre-copular element must
systematically be left-dislocated and followed by ‘ça’, a fact which is discussed below.)
                                                                                                                                                        
3
 The term ‘specificational sentences’ has also been used to refer to such examples, at least by those theorists
who believe (as I do) that connectivity can arise if and only if a copular sentence is ‘specificational’. But since
the latter term is more theory-laden, I mostly avoid it in what follows.
4
 The term is introduced in Sharvit 1999.
4(6)  Bound Variable Connectivity
a. What [no student]i enjoys__ is hisi finals (Sharvit 1999,  (1b))
b. [No student]i enjoy hisi finals
(7) Opacity
a. What John seeks __ is a unicorn (Den Dikken et al.   2000, (5b))
b. John seeks a unicorn
(8)  NPI licensing
a. What John didn’t buy __ was any books (Sharvit 1999, (7))
b. John didn’t buy any books
(9)  Conditions A, B and C (Sharvit 1999, (2))
a. What hei is __ is proud of himselfi/*j / him*i, j / John*i, j
b. Hei is proud of himselfi/*j / him*i, j / John*i, j  
The next observation, which has become standard, is that the whole range of
connectivity effects holds only in case the post-copular element is read as non-predicational.
Thus no binding-theoretic connectivity effects arise in the following examples6:
(10) a. What Johni likes __ is important to himi / *himselfi
b. What hei likes __ is important to Johni
It should be noted that not all standard tests are necessarily good c-command tests. Thus
Jacobson 1994 and Sharvit 1999 argue convincingly that pronouns may sometimes be bound
without c-command (the following is from Sharvit 1999, (19))
(11)  a. The picture of himself that every student bought was a nuisance to him
b.[∀x: x a student] (the picture of x that x a bought was a nuisance to x)
Although (11)a. is clearly predicational, the quantifier ‘every student’ is allowed to bind
outside of the relative clause. This, however, could weaken the initial generalization only if
                                                                                                                                                        
5
 Although there is no 'connected' variant of the sentence in this case, I will still call examples such as (4)
'connectivity sentences', following in this a terminological move made in Sharvit 1999.
6
 Occasionally the presence or absence of a connectivity effect can be used to disambiguate a sentence, as is the
case in this (famous) minimal pair (Higgins 1976):
 (i) a. What Johni is is important to himselfi  => John is important to himself / self-important
b. What Johni is is important to himi        => John’s function (e.g. being director) is important to John
While b. predicates a certain property of the thing that John is, a. equates what John is with the property [λx x is
important to x]. The semantic difference is reflected in the presence or absence of a connectivity effect, which is
of course one of the main facts to be explained.
5all c-command tests could be dismissed in this fashion. But if such is not the case, all we can
conclude is that variable-binding is not a good test for c-command, which still leaves us with
several reliable tests - and an independent problem to solve in specificational sentences7.
1.2 Previous approaches: Revisionist vs. Conservative accounts
There are two ways to resolve the contradiction between the appearance of
connectivity sentences and the verdict of the c-command tests: by abandoning the tests, or by
revising the structure of the problematic sentences. 
1.2.1 Revisionist accounts
A Revisionist wishes to abandon the tests. Her contention is that what you see in (1)a
is what you get in the syntax. The reason we had a problem in the first place, the Revisionist
will claim, was that we wrongly assumed that, say, Condition A really is a test for c-
command. While it may be one in simple cases, this is not in general true. The Revisionist’s
advantage is that she keeps syntactic abstraction to a minimum. But her burden is that she has
to re-analyze each and every one of the syntactician’s c-command tests to show that they are
not c-command tests after all, at least in the case of specificational pseudoclefts. In Jacobson
1994 and Sharvit 1999 this enterprise is pursued with an elaborate account of Binding, Scope
and NPI licensing which involves a higher-order semantics rather than a structural condition
like c-command. Accordingly, this line of research has often been called the ‘semantic’
approach to the Connectivity problem. Clearly, for the semantic approach to be completely
successful the theory must show that each modification of the standard syntactic theory is
motivated independently of the facts to be explained here (or else the account will be
stipulative, at least to some extent).
 In a nutshell, Sharvit’s bold and highly interesting approach has the following logic:
1. First, she observes that some system must be posited to allow variables to be bound
without appeal to c-command (see (11) above). She resorts to quantification over functions to
do so. This mechanism can then be extended to the bound variable example in (6), which is
now taken to equate a function f from students to things that they like with a function that
associates to each student his finals. Simplifying somewhat, the result is as follows:
                                                 
7
 I set aside in what follows Den Dikken et al.’s observation that NPI licensing does not always pattern with
other c-command tests. Their generalization is that NPI licensing systematically fails in English whenever the
order of the elements is reversed in a standard connectivity sentence; all other c-command tests, by contrast,
yield the same results as in the standard case. See Appendix II for further remarks on Den Dikken et al. 2000.
6(12)  a. What [no student]i enjoys __ is hisi finals
 b. [ιf: f
 
is a natural function & [no x: x a student] x enjoys f(x)]  = [λx the finals of x]
where ι is the definite description operator, properly defined8.
Opacity connectivity can be analyzed in similar fashion by making the functions intensional.
2. Second, Sharvit resorts to Reinhart’s theory of binding, based on the idea that Condition C
is a reflex of the systematic preference for bound readings over accidental coreference. Given
the account of bound variable readings without c-command in 1., Reinhart’s competition
mechanism directly yields an account of Condition C effects.
3. Third, Sharvit gives a higher-order account of Condition A effects, which she sees as a
morphological by-product of semantic reflexivization. Accordingly she analyzes (1a) as:
(13) a. What every man shaved __ was himself (Sharvit 1999, (51a))
b. [ιf: f is a natural function & [every x: x a man] x shaved f(x)]  = [λx x]9
Thus Sharvit assumes that a reflexive is always interpreted as an identity function, i.e. [λx x].
4. Fourth, Sharvit derives Condition B effects by postulating that morphological
reflexivization is applied whenever possible. Thus Condition B effects are derived from 3.
together with a principle of preference for reflexive marking over, so to speak, ‘accidental
reflexivization’.
5. Finally, Sharvit must account for the last test, NPI licensing. She postulates that only
downward-entailingness is necessary to license an NPI. She further shows that the relevant
contexts are indeed downward-entailing, which yields the desired results10.
1.2.2 Conservative Accounts
The Jacobson/Sharvit approach to connectivity requires a complete re-analysis of the
role of c-command in syntax. By contrast, the conservative approach (which is also called the
‘syntactic’ approach) leaves the sanctity of (at least some of) our c-command tests untouched,
but claims that there is more to the structure of (1)a than meets the eye. Specifically, the
                                                 
8
 Here is Sharvit’s formalism applied to our example (Max is a maximality operator):
 (i) Max (λg<e, e> [Nat’(g) & ∀x (student’(x) → ¬enjoy’(x, g(x)))]) = λy [Max (λz [finals (z, y)])]
9
 Sharvit’s precise formulation is the following (her (51b):
 (i) Max (λg<e, e> [Nat’(g) & ∀x (man’(x) → shave’(x, g(x)))]) = λx x
10
 Den Dikken et al. 2000 suggest that Sharvit’s approach might be correct, but only for their Type B
pseudoclefts [=inverted pseudoclefts, which disallow full clauses and NPIs in the pre-copular position]. If one
were to take this proposal seriously, it would be desirable that Sharvit’s account should not extend to NPI
licensing, since the crucial property of Type B pseudoclefts according to Den Dikken et al. 2000 is precisely that
they do not license NPIs. Den Dikken et al.'s version of Sharvit would presumably postulate that downward-
entailingness is not enough, and that c-command is in fact necessary to license NPIs.
7Conservative’s contention is that at some level of representation the sentence does indeed
contain a connected clause similar to (1b). When one gets to the actual theories, this approach
comes in two or three varieties (depending on how Heycock & Kroch’s theory is classified):
a) The reconstruction approach claims that the connected sentence is reconstructed in
Logical Form, as is illustrated below:
(14) a. [What John likes __ ] is himself
b. [What John likes himself] is himself
There is one obvious problem with this theory, which has been noted by a number of
researchers: the movement/reconstruction that one has to postulate violates usual syntactic
constraints, since in this case movement is not to a c-commanding position. In addition Den
Dikken et al. 2000 observe that reconstruction theories fail to account for NPI licensing,
which is known to require c-command at S-structure rather than at LF.  The hypothesis is
therefore difficult to maintain, although I refer the reader to the literature for more criticisms
(and possibly defenses) of this approach (see Sharvit 1999 and Den Dikken et al. 2000).
b) Heycock & Kroch 1999 argue for a variant of the reconstruction approach, according to
which the connected sentence does not arise, as other reconstruction processes do, at LF.
Rather, the derivation of a connected sentence is claimed to be a post-LF process, which is
licensed/triggered on semantic grounds. Thus they agree with the first step of Sharvit’s
analysis of ‘What John likes is himself’: connectivity sentences are a variety of identity
sentences. But unlike Sharvit, who resorts to quantification over functions even in the simple
cases, Heycock & Kroch 1999 postulate that the elements that get equated denote entities11.
They further posit that, at some level of representation, a sentence involving a specificational
pseudocleft gets transformed into a connected sentence by an operation called ‘ι-conversion’,
which  “eliminates the ι operator and substitutes the focus of the pseudocleft for the ι-bound
variable”, as shown below:
(15)  [ιx<e>: John likes x<e>] = himself  --ι-conversion-->  John likes himself
The main problem with this approach is that, as the authors recognize, their main source of
evidence for this additional level of syntactic representation lies in the phenomenon to be
explained itself. In this sense the account is stipulative. Of course what is a stipulation at one
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 In the simple cases, that is. Since Heycock & Kroch 1999 assume  (following Partee 1986) that be is cross-
categorial, any two elements can be equated as long as their types match. For instance in 'What John is is proud
of himself', the elements that are equated are of type <e, t>.
8point may turn out to be a principle upon consideration of further data. But Heycock & Kroch
have not yet shown that this is indeed the case.
c) The last type of conservative approach is the Question in Disguise Theory, originally due
to Ross 1972 (see also Ross 2000, 2001, who credits Faraci 1971). The advantage of this
approach is that it accounts straightforwardly for connectivity without postulating either an
unmotivated sort of movement/reconstruction, or an additional level of syntactic
representation. It also meets Den Dikken et al. 2000’s requirement that the connected clause
be present at S-structure so as to satisfy NPI licensing. In addition, Ross’s approach is made
particularly plausible by the existence of visible structures that are very similar to the one
postulated in (16)b:
(16) a. What I did then was call the grocer (Ross (1972), (39a))
b. What I did then was I called the grocer (Ross (1972), (39b))
As D. Sportiche (p.c.) points out, Ross’s examples are not only suggestive, but they also
provide a conceptual argument against all competing accounts. Every theory must account for
the existence of  (16)b. Once this is done (and independently of how it is done), the Question
in Disguise Theory only has to posit that ellipsis applies to part of the post-copular element in
(16)b to yield (16)a, along lines which are independently motivated in question-answer pairs
(see below). By contrast, any competing account will have to posit one type of mechanism
for b. (call it Mb), and another one for a. (Ma). Of necessity, Mb will have to resemble Ross’s
account, since in this case the morphology tells us that the post-copular element is a full
clause. By hypothesis Ma, which accounts for (16)a, is different from Mb. But Mb + Ellipsis
also accounts for (16)a. As a consequence, two different mechanisms generate the same
sentences, which obviously leads to considerable redundancy in the grammar12. Maybe such a
redundancy is real, but this has to be shown.
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 Sharvit 1999 grants that the Question in Disguise theory might be necessary for a., but argues that it does not
work in full generality:    “As observed by Ross, some dialects of English actually admit a full sentence in the
post-copular position of a specificational pseudocleft:
(71) What John read __ was John read Huck Finn
Indeed, it may be true that for these cases we need something like the question analysis.  But I do not think that
we can extend it to all cases, especially not to specificational sentences with headed relatives, since here, a full
sentence is not allowed on the surface:
 (72) *The thing John is looking for __ is John is looking for a job and a girlfriend / John is looking for a job
and John is looking for a girlfriend.” [pp. 320–321]”
Sportiche’s conceptual argument still holds, in my opinion.  Since in some languages ellipsis in connectivity
sentences is obligatory, whatever factor forces ellipsis in these cases might force it in (72) as well.  Of course
9Despite this conceptual advantage, the Question in Disguise Theory must settle
several points. Briefly, the challenge is to explain why connectivity sentences are expressed
the way they are so as to produce the meanings that they do. Each part of a connectivity
sentence raises a particular question:
(i) How is the form of the pre-copular element to be explained? An English pseudocleft has
the form of a question; but in other languages this is not the case, and yet connectivity effects
do hold. (Izvorski 1997, Sharvit 1999, Cecchetto 2000, 2001). In addition, connectivity
effects hold in English with plain noun phrases (Higgins 1976). I argue that quite generally
and productively noun phrases can be interpreted as concealed questions in certain
environments.
(ii) Why is the verb be used systematically in connectivity sentences? Den Dikken et al. 2000
argue that in these cases be expresses neither identity nor predication, but is simply an
inflectional element that spells-out a functional projection which they call ‘Topic Phrase’. By
contrast, I suggest that in connectivity sentences be is used because it means identity.
(iii) Why is part of the answer optionally or obligatorily deleted, depending on the language
and on the construction? Den Dikken et al. 2000 go a long way towards an explanation,
although they admit that some details are still unclear. Independent principles should conspire
to explain why and in which cases deletion is optional or obligatory in connectivity
sentences. I show that the same patterns of ellipsis are displayed in connectivity sentences
and in question-answer pairs.
(iv) Finally, how is the meaning of the whole sentence derived from the meaning of the parts
discussed in (i)-(iii)? I show that the semantics follows if Groenendik & Stokhof's analysis of
questions is adopted.
By way of summary, the following provides a classification of copular sentences and of the
various analyses of the connectivity problem.
(17) Typology of copular sentences and theories of connectivity
Type Con-
necti-
vity?
1st element be 2nd element Main Features
of the analysis
What John likes is good for himPredicational No
Entity Ø Predicate
(Mary thinks that)
John       is      Peter
Plain Identity No
Entity = Entity
                                                                                                                                                        
everyone has to find out what this factor is - by no means an easy task [but see Den Dikken et al. 2000 for a line
of explanation].
10
What John likes  is     himselfSpecificational Yes
 ? ? ?
-Revisionists
Sharvit 1999 Function = Function
• Sticks to appearances
• Reanalyzes all c-command tests
-Conservatives
Heycock/Kroch Entity = Entity Posits an additional level of syntax
Reconstruction ? ? ? Posits a new variety of movement
Question in
Disguise I:Den
Dikken et al.
Question 'Top' Answer
• Must explain why the question & answer
do not have their normal form
• Must explain why be is used
Question in
Disguise II Question = Answer
Must explain why the question & answer do
not have their normal form
2 Motivating Each Component of the Analysis
We begin by motivating each component of the analysis. The first two subsections
(the first element is question, the last element is an answer) are mostly directed against
Sharvit 1999 and Heycock & Kroch 1999. The third subsection (be means identity) is
directed against Den Dikken et al. 2000 and Moro 1997.
2.1 The first element is an indirect question
2.1.1 Ross’s paradigm
When a full answer appears in the post-copular position of a connectivity sentence, as
in (16)b, it is particularly plausible that the pre-copular element is a question. But what about
cases in which a full answer does not appear? Ross 1985 argues that even then the pre-
copular element should be analyzed as question rather than as a free relative; for there are
striking similarities between the restrictions on embedded questions and on pseudoclefts (he
attributes the observation to Faraci 1974):
(18) a. 1. I know / *ate what else she cooked
2. What (else) she is going to cook is spaghetti flambé
 b. 1. I knew / *ate what it was that she cooked
2. What it was that she cooked was a stewed eel
 c. 1. I *know / ate whatever she cooked
2. What(*ever) she cooked might not be stuffed peas
(18)a. and b. show that ‘what else’ and ‘what it was that’ are acceptable both in an embedded
question an in a specificational pseudocleft, but not after ‘eat’, whose complement is a
garden-variety free relative. The opposite pattern is found in (18)c with ‘whatever’ , which is
acceptable in pseudoclefts and in embedded questions, but not after ‘eat’. Thus pseudoclefts
behave like questions and unlike free relatives, as the Question in Disguise Theory would
11
lead one to expect. Further arguments for this conclusion are provided in Den Dikken et al.
2000 (Section 4)13.
2.1.2 Question anaphora
Obviously these are impressive similarities. However the point should be made
stronger to show that every case of connectivity involves a concealed question, even when the
morphology would seem to suggest the opposite. French is an interesting case in point, for
the morphology suggests that in general questions cannot appear in connectivity sentences.
Thus only 'ce que' ('it that') can introduce both an indirect question and a pseudocleft, while
other wh-words cannot be used to introduce connectivity sentences:
(19) a. Ce qu’ili aimait, c’était  lui-mêmei
   [it that hei  liked]k, itk was himselfi
‘What he liked was himself’
b. *Qui ili aimait, c’était  lui-mêmei
   who  hei  liked]k, itk was himselfi
 The challenge, then, is to show that even in French an element that can appear in the pre-
copular position of a connectivity sentence is interpreted as a question. This can be done in an
indirect way by resorting to question anaphora, as in the following paradigm:
(20) a. Je me suis longtemps demandé [ce qu'ili aimait]k, et j’ai finalement
    I  me   am    long          asked     [it that hei  liked]k, and I have finally
‘For a long time I have been wondering what he liked, and have finally
appris que ck’était  lui-mêmei/??luii/*l’imbécilei/*Jeani
learned that itk was himselfi / ??himi/*the idioti /* Jeani
learned that it was himself / him / the idiot / Jean’
b. Ce qu’ ili aimait, c’était  lui-mêmei/??luii/*l’imbécilei/*Jeani
  
[it that hei  liked]k, itk was himselfi / ??himi/*the idioti /* Jeani
‘What he liked was himself / him / the idiot / Jean’
c. Ili aimait lui-même14i/??luii/*l’imbécilei/*Jeani
   Hei  liked himselfi / ??himi/*the idioti /* Jeani
‘He liked himself / him / the idiot / Jean’
(20)b is a connectivity sentence, as shown by the comparison with (20)c.  (20)a is obtained
by putting the left-dislocated element of (20)b in an environment where it is forced to be
interpreted as an indirect question because it appears under the verb se demander (to
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 The paradigm in (18) should be refined in several respects: (i) O. Percus (p.c.) informs me that the
generalization is not entirely correct, and that furthermore this fact was noted in Faraci 1974. Percus notes that
for some speakers, "what else" pseudoclefts are bad, while "what else" embedded questions are fine". (ii) An
anonymous reviewer notes that  ‘ever’ can appear in some free relatives, e.g. ‘I’ll eat whatever else you cook for
me (... but I won’t eat that)’. I leave this for future research.
14
 'lui-même' must be strongly focused. Otherwise the clitic 'se' must be included: 'Il s'aimait lui-même'.
12
wonder). Exactly the same connectivity effects arise, but now coindexation between ça and
the embedded question ascertains that the pre-copular element is indeed a question15.
Additional evidence that the pre-copular element is propositional is provided by the
observation that ‘ça’ (or rather ‘c’’, its phonologically elided form) is obligatory in sentences
that yield connectivity effects, just as it is with identity sentences that involve non-individual-
denoting expressions:
(21) a. Ce qu’ili aimait, c’était  lui-mêmei
  
 It that he liked, it was him-self
‘What he liked was himself’
b. ??Ce qu’ili aimait était  lui-mêmei
  
 It that he like      was him-self
(22) a. ?? Être vieux est être oublié
 To-be old is to-be forgotten
b. Être vieux, c’est être oublié
To-be old, it is to-be forgotten
‘To be old is to be forgotten’
c.  Être vieux est ennuyeux
     To-be old is boring
    ‘To be old is boring’
The generalization seems to be that non-individual denoting elements that appear in the first
position of an identity sentence must be left-dislocated and followed by ça. The same fact
holds of connectivity sentences, which suggests that their first element is also non-individual
denoting, as in (21).  This can be explained if, as we claim, the first element of a connectivity
sentence is systematically a concealed question.
2.1.3 Connectivity sentences with full (embedded) questions
An additional observation is that every indirect question in French can in fact yield
connectivity effects, albeit in a slightly different construction. Replacing the copula with
voilà ('here-is', without a copula) and reversing the order of elements, we obtain sentences
that seem to have a closely related semantics: the first element is equated to the last one.
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 Interestingly this pattern can also arise  when ‘ça’ is coindexed with an indirect question which could not
appear in the pre-copular position of a connectivity sentence, as is the case with 'qui il aimait' in (i) (compare
with (20)b):
(i) Je me suis longtemps demandé [qui ili aimait]k, et j’ai finalement
   I  me   am    long          asked    [who hei  liked]k, and I have finally
‘For a long time I have been wondering who he liked, and have finally
appris que ck’était  lui-mêmei/??luii/*l’imbécilei/*Jeani
learned that it was himselfi / ??himi/*the idioti /* Jeani
learned that it was himself / him / the idiot / Jean’
This suggests that the reason standard embedded questions are blocked in specificational sentences is morpho-
syntactic, not semantic (more on this below).
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Connectivity still holds, even though the question-like element could not appear in a copular
sentence:
(23)  XP voilà YP (with XP=concealed question; YP=wh CP)
a. Contre lui-mêmei/??luii/*Jeani -  voilà contre qui ili a lutté
Against himselfi /* himi / *Jeani - here-is against whom  has fought
b.   (?) De faire le moindre mal à quiconque -  voilà ce que Jean a refusé
    To do the slightest harm to anyone - here-is it that Jean has refused
c. Avec sai voiture/*la voiture de Jeani - voilà comment il est venu
 With hisi car /* the car of Jeani - here-is how hei is come
These examples are similar to standard connectivity sentences, except that (i) the order of the
elements has been reversed (the answer comes first, the question comes last), and (ii) the verb
be does not appear at all, and is replaced with ‘voilà’.  We may further observe that the
question is embedded rather than direct, since ce que and not qu’est-ce que is used as an
inanimate wh-object (in my dialect ‘qu’est-ce que’ is degraded to introduce embedded
questions; and ‘ce que’ can only introduce an indirect question):
(24) a. Sai voiture/*la voiture de Jeani, voilà ce qu’il a vendu /?? qu’est-ce  qu’il a vendu
    His car / the car of Jean, here-is it that he has sold / ??what is it that he has sold
b. Je me demande ce qu’il a vendu / ?qu’est-ce qu’il a vendu
    I  to-me ask it that he has sold /  ?what is it that he has sold
c. Qu’est-ce qu’il a vendu? / *Ce qu’il a vendu? (possible only on an echo reading)
  What is-it that he has sold?  *It that he has sold?
2.2 The last element is an elided answer
We now turn to the last element, and attempt to show that it is in fact an elided
answer.
2.2.1 Propositional anaphora
Ross 1972 gave examples in which a full answer could appear overtly (e.g. (16) above).
But in French this is not possible (with one exception discussed below). Still, we can
replicate Ross's argument by resorting once again to propositional anaphora. Instead of
directly equating the pre-copular element with a clause, we equate it with a deictic DP which
itself refers to a proposition:
(25) a. Ce qu’ili est,  c’est ceci: (il est) fier de luii / *fier de Jeani
      It that he is , it is this:(he is) proud of him(self) / proud of Jean
   ‘What he is is this: his is proud of himself / proud of Jean’
b. Ce qu’ili est,  c’est fier de luii / *fier de Jeani
     It that he is, it is proud of him(self) / proud of Jean
  ‘What he is is proud of himself / proud of Jean’
a’. Ce qu’il refuse, c’est ceci: (il refuse de) faire le moindre mal à  quiconque
 It that he refuses, it is this: (he refuses to) do the slightest harm to anyone
'What he refuses is this: to cause any harm to anyone'
b’. Ce qu’il refuse, c’est de faire le moindre mal à quiconque
    It that he refuses, it is to do the slightest harm to anyone
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'What he refuses is to cause any harm to anyone'
(25)a and a’ have the same semantics as b and b’, but unlike the latter they wear their clausal
nature on their sleeves, so to speak. This shows that the semantic component can interpret
copular sentences whose post-copular element is propositional. (In addition, we note that in a.
and a’. the last clause does not have to be elided but can be; this is even the most natural
option, which makes these sentences particularly similar to standard connectivity sentences).
2.2.2 Degrees of ellipsis
Even without resorting to propositional anaphora, the clausal nature of the post-copular
element can be demonstrated in special cases which involve various degrees of ellipsis, and
are particularly problematic for proponents of the revisionist approach. The general idea is
that every degree of ellipsis is represented in French. Although the conditions that make
ellipsis obligatory are ill-understood, a theory that denies that ellipsis is possible at all is
bound to make incorrect predictions.
• No ellipsis
Consider first the following French sentences:
(26) a. Ce que j’ai fait,       c’est fermé la fenêtre
It that I have done, it is closed the window
 ‘What I did was close the window’
b.  Ce que j’ai fait,        c’est que j’ai     fermé la fenêtre
 It that I have done,  it is that I have closed the window
 ‘What I did was I opened the window’
On Sharvit’s analysis, (26)a. could only be given one of the analyses below:
(27) a. [ιx<e, t>: I did x<e, t>] = [λx<e> x<e> closes the window]
b. [ιf<e, <e, t>>: f<e, <e, t>>is a natural function & I did f<e, <e, t>>(I)]=[λx<e> close the window]
But neither analysis will work for (26)b., where the post-copular element is clearly
propositional, and hence cannot be equated with an element of the predicate type in (27)a. or
of the higher functional type in (27)b. On the Question in Disguise theory, on the other hand,
the case is unproblematic. Both (26)a. and (26)b. involve a concealed question and an elided
answer, with the sole difference that ellipsis has applied to a larger chunk in a. than in b.
Presumably the reason a full clause can appear in b. is that it does not lead to a repetition of
the VP found in the pre-copular part. This correctly predicts the following contrast:
(28) a. Ce que j’ai fermé, c’est la fenêtre
 It that I have closed, it is the window
‘What I closed was the window’
b. *Ce que j’ai fermé, c’est (que) j’ai fermé la fenêtre.
 It that I have closed, it is (that) I have closed the window
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 (Conditions on ellipsis are studied in far greater detail in Den Dikken et al. 2000.)
• Partial ellipsis
The same type of argument can be extended to some cases in which partial ellipsis is
obligatory, although the result is still uninterpretable from a Revisionist's standpoint.
Consider the following:
(29) a. Ce contre quoi ili a lutté, c’est sai patrie / la patrie de Jean*i, k
It against which he has fought, it is his motherland / the motherland of John
‘What he fought against was his motherland/John’s motherland’
b. *Ce contre quoi ili a lutté, c’est (qu’)il a lutté contre la patrie de Jeani, k
It against which hei has fought, it is (that) hei has fought against the motherland of Jean
c. Ce contre quoi ili a lutté, c’est contre sai patrie / contre la  patrie de Jean*i, k
It against which hei has fought, it is against hisi motherland/against the  motherland of Ji
‘What he fought against was his motherland/John’s motherland’
Again, Sharvit would presumaby offer the following analysis for a. (because the possessive
pronoun is bound,  quantification over functions has to be used in this case):
(30)  [ιf<e, e>: f<e, e>is a natural function & I fought against f<e, e>(I)]  = [λx<e> x<e>'s motherland]
But this solution will not extend to c., which is also fairly natural in French16, for whatever
the  type of ‘against his motherland’ (presumably, <e, t>), it is not of type <e>, and thus
could not yield a function of the right type. By contrast, on the Question in Disguise theory
the solution is straightforward: a. and b. display different degrees of ellipsis, both of which
are also exemplified in question-answer pairs17:
(31) Contre quoi a-t-il lutté?   -OkSa patrie / -OkContre sa patrie
Against what has he fought? -His motherland / -Against his motherland
‘What did he fight against?’  -His motherland / -Against his motherland
To summarize, the repetition of a preposition, just as the appearance of a full clause in the
post-copular position, are strong morpho-syntactic arguments against Sharvit’s theory. By
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 The relevant facts can be replicated in English when the pre-copular element is a CP, but apparently not when
it is a DP:
 (i) a. What hei fought against was against John*i, k’s motherland
b. What hei fought against was John*i, k’s motherland
(ii) a. *?The country I fought against was against Russia
b. The country I fought against was Russia
I do not know why repetition of the preposition is blocked in the DP case.
17
 NPI licensing is somewhat puzzling in these environments, since (to my ear) it appears  to require a repetition
of the preposition:
 (i) a. *? Ce contre quoi il a refusé de lutter, c’est la moindre infraction
     It against which he has refused to fight, it is the slightest violation
b. Ce contre quoi il a refusé de lutter, c’est contre la moindre infraction
           It against which he has refused to fight, it is against the slightest violation
I do not have an explanation for this fact.
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contrast, they are unsurprising on the Question in Disguise theory.
• Obligatory ellipsis
One apparent weakness of the Question in Disguise theory is that it fails to predict
that ellipsis of the answer is in many cases and languages obligatory in connectivity
sentences, although it is only optional in question-answer pairs. I do not have an explanation
for this fact (but see Den Dikken et al. 2000). However I do not think that it can be used to
argue against the present approach, since exactly the same patterns of ellipsis hold whenever
it is extremely plausible that a question is indeed equated with an answer, as in the following
examples, already discussed under a different guise:
(32) Je me suis longtemps demandé [ce qu'ili aimait]k, et j’ai finalement
    I  me   am    long          asked     [it that hei  liked]k, and I have finally
‘For a long time I have been wondering what he liked, and have finally
appris que ck’était  lui-mêmei/*qu'il s'aimait lui-mêmei
learned that thisk was himselfi / *that he liked himselfi
learned that it was himself / *that he liked himself
On the Question in Disguise theory this sentence is unsurprising: an indirect question (‘what
he liked’) is equated with an elided answer through the mediation of the anaphoric
demonstrative ‘this’. But if one wanted to deny that the Question in Disguise analysis holds
of garden-variety pseudoclefts, one would still have to admit that in the relatively clear case
of question-answer equation in (32) the same patterns of ellipsis hold as are posited for
standard connectivity sentences on the present theory. Thus although the obligatoriness of
ellipsis is still a mystery, it is one which we know to exist independently of the connectivity
problem.
2.3  Be means identity, but connectivity sentences do not equate referential elements
Almost all the pieces of the puzzle are now in place. All we need to show is that the
verb be in connectivity sentences has indeed the meaning of identity, and we will have what
we need to derive the semantics of the construction.
2.3.1  Be means identity
Den Dikken et al.  2000 outline a version of the Question in Disguise theory in which
be spells-out a ‘Topic’ head that marks the question-answer relation - a somewhat stipulative
move, at least from a semantic standpoint (why should the question-answer relation be
marked by a special head?).  In this respect we side with the Revisionists, who assume that be
has the meaning of identity.  Without reviewing all the existing arguments (see Sharvit 1999
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and Heycock & Kroch 1999), I would like to adduce additional evidence in favor of this
conclusion. In a nutshell, connectivity does not require the presence of be, but can arise
whenever the semantics of the construction is that of an equation. The observation was
already made for English by Higgins 1976, and it can be replicated and generalized in the
following French examples:
(33)  a. Il a refusé de causer la moindre souffrance
   He has refused to cause the slightest suffering
   'He refused to cause any suffering'
b (De) causer la moindre souffrance, voilà ce qu’il a refusé
(To) cause the slightest suffering, here-is it that he has refused
c.  (?) Ce qu’il a refusé, ça se réduit à ceci: causer la moindre souffrance
     It that he has refused, it itself reduces to this: cause the slightest suffering
     'What he refused reduces to this: to cause any suffering'
d.  (?)Ce qu’il a refusé, ça n’est pas autre chose que de causer la moindre souffrance
  It that he has refused, it NE is not another thing than to cause the slightest suffering
 Voilà  (‘here-is’), se réduit à  (‘reduces to’) and  n’est pas autre chose que  (‘is nothing but’)
have a meaning which implies identity. Thus the generalization appears to be that
connectivity effects can arise whenever the pre- and the post-copular elements are
semantically equated.  The same point can be made with the following English examples:
(34) a. *Hisi problem is Johni's arrogance.
b. *Hisi problem lies in Johni's arrogance.
c. *Hisi problem reduces to Johni's arrogance.
d. Hisi problem caused Johni's arrogance.
While (34)a-c entail that ‘his problem’ and ‘John’s arrogance’ are in some sense identical,
this is not the case in (34)d (a cause is not identical with its effect), which accounts for the
contrast. This shows once more that the be that yields connectivity effects should be taken to
be the be of identity.
2.3.2 No connectivity effects arise in identity sentences that equate two referential elements
Although connectivity sentences are a variety of identity sentences, they are crucially
different from other identity sentences in that they equate a question and an answer. I now
show that in identity sentences that equate referential terms, connectivity effects
systematically fail (in Schlenker 1998 this was taken as an argument against competing
accounts - incorrectly, since the latter can also handle this observation; see footnote 19).
 The facts are clearest with DPs. In statements of mistaken identity, connectivity
effects systematically disappear (the same facts hold in French):
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(35) a. I thought that hisi brother was Johni.
b. *I thought that hisi worry was Johni.
a'.  I knew that hisi brother wasn’t Johni
[Context: Didn’t you mistake John for his twin, Peter? No: ...]
b'. *I knew that hisi worry wasn’t Johni
In this case it would not make much sense to read his brother as a concealed question (i.e. as
Who is John's brother?), since given world knowledge it is clear that John could not be his
own brother. As a result, only the 'mistaken identity reading' is salient even independently of
the issue of connectivity. But it is easy to construct examples that can be read either as
'mistaken identity' sentences or as 'concealed question' sentences. In these cases the syntax
can be used to disambiguate: if the connectivity effect is obviated, a 'mistaken identity'
reading arises. Consider the following:
(36) [Mary is a defendant in a trial. Her lawyer, Ann, looks like Mary.  Sam does not know
that Ann is a lawyer.]
a. Sam thinks that her lawyer is herself       => no 'mistaken identity' reading
b. Sam thinks that her lawyer is her        => 'mistaken identity' reading
a'. Sam knows that her lawyer isn't herself => no 'mistaken identity' reading
b'. Sam knows that her lawyer isn't her  => 'mistaken identity' reading
The interesting fact is that (36)a cannot be uttered to mean that Sam mistakes Mary's lawyer
(=Ann) for Mary. By contrast, this is the most salient reading in (36)b. The latter would
typically be uttered if Sam is acquainted with Mary's lawyer (=Ann) under some description
α, and with Mary herself under some description β, and is willing to assent to: α=β.
(Example: Sam saw Mary at a cocktail party; he also saw Ann talking to the judge. And he
thinks: 'The woman I saw at the cocktail party is none other than the woman I saw talking to
the judge'). This is not what (36)a means; (36)a does not require that Sam be acquainted with
Mary's lawyer at all. All that is required is that he should assent to something like: 'Mary is
representing herself’.
Why should such contrasts hold? On the present proposal the syntactic part of the
explanation is simple: the embedded clause in (36)a-a' has the structure in (37)a, where her c-
commands herself locally. By contrast, (36)b is a 'standard' identity sentence, as represented
in (37)b, where the post-copular her is not bound at all.
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(37) a.
      ?x
         heri is
             lawyer x         heri
          lawyer herselfi
b.
      [heri  lawyer]k
 is         heri
This, however, does not derive the semantic difference between between (36)a and
(36)b. And for good reason: (36) and (36)b are equivalent in unembedded contexts. This very
equivalence (which will be derived in next Section) is of course what prompted many
researchers to claim that there is simply no difference between connectivity sentences and
standard identity sentences. So how can a semantic difference arise in embedded contexts?
The key to the solution lies in the observation that (37)a and (37)b are not substitutable salva
veritate when embedded under an attitude verb. This is because a referential term τ construed
De Re in an attitude report makes a semantic contribution of its own - roughly, that the
attitude holder is acquainted with the denotation of τ. No such contribution is made in (37)b,
where  heri lawyer x has the type of a proposition and thus is not referential at all. This will
suffice to account for the contrast.
Let us consider in greater detail the semantics of referential terms in attitude reports.
The initial problem, which goes back to Quine 1956, was that both of the following may be
true at the same time if Ralph is acquainted with Ortcutt under two different guises: Ralph
believes, of Ortcutt (qua the man in the brown hat), that he is a spy. And he also believes, of
Ortcutt (qua the man seen at the beach), that he is not a spy. But we would not want to infer
from this that Ralph thinks that Ortcutt is and is not a spy, which would make him irrational.
Kaplan 1969's solution  was to assume that 'Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy' asserts that
(i) Ralph is acquainted with Ortcutt under some description α (e.g. ‘the man seen at the
cocktail party’), and further that (ii) he would assent to: α is a spy (e.g. ‘The man seen at the
cocktail party is a spy’). Ralph may also be acquainted with Ortcutt under some different
description β (e.g. ‘the man seen at the beach’), and he may assent to: β is not a spy (e.g.
‘The man seen at the beach is not a spy’). As long as α and β are distinct descriptions (as in
our example), Ralph may hold both beliefs without thereby being irrational. In this analysis
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De Re terms are replaced with variables over descriptions, yielding the following (where
R(α, Ortcutt, Ralph) abbreviates: 'Ralph is acquainted with Ortcutt under the description α18):
(38) a. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy
b. ∃α (R(α, Ortcutt, Ralph) & Ralph believes: α is a spy)
Ralph is acquainted with Ortcutt under some description α and believes: α is a spy
Applied to (36)b, this yields the following analysis of 'Sam thinks that her lawyer is her' (we
assume that [heri lawyer]k is read De Re):
(39) ∃α ∃β (R(α,[heri lawyer]k, Sam) & R(β,heri, Sam) & Sam thinks α=β )
Sam is acquainted with the lawyer under some description α, he is also acquainted
with the lawyer under some (other)  description β,  and he believes: α=β
Given Kaplan's analysis, the sentence now entails that Sam is acquainted with Mary’s lawyer,
Ann (this is because (39) entails ∃αR(α,[heri lawyer]k, Sam)).  No such requirement holds in
(36)a because heri lawyer x is not referential, and thus does not fall under Kaplan's analysis of
referential terms. This accounts for the intuitive difference between the two cases.
The same observations carry over to cases of pseudocleft connectivity, although the
facts are less clear (for reasons I do not understand). Consider the following:
(40) [In a safari, Mary shot at some animal - and missed it. The animal ran away]
a. Sam thinks that what Maryi shot at is herselfi => no mistaken identity reading
b. Sam thinks that what Maryi shot at is heri  => mistaken identity reading
c. Maryi shot at herselfi/*heri
For (40)b to be true, Sam must be acquainted with the animal Mary shot at, and must mistake
it for her, maybe because he is observing the scene from afar. Thus (40)b would be relatively
felicitous if Sam, who was trying to follow Mary, suddenly starts going in the direction in
which the animal just disappeared. I could explain his behavior by saying: 'Well, Sam thinks
that what Mary shot at is her'. By contrast, if (40)a is uttered, there is no requirement that
Sam be acquainted with the animal Mary shot at. Sam just thinks that Mary short herself, and
does not mistake anything for anything else19.
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 Kaplan 1969 gives a more precise definition: R(α, x, Ralph) [‘α represents x to Ralph’] if and only if:
(i) α denotes x
(ii) α is a name of x for Ralph
(iii) α is sufficiently vivid
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 Contrary to what was claimed in Schlenker 1998, these facts can be handled by competing theories. Consider
first Heycock & Kroch's account. Recall their basic proposal: 'What John likes is himself' is transformed by 'ι-
conversion' into: 'John likes himself', as represented in (15) (repeated here for convenience):
(i)[=(15)] What John likes is himself
a. [ιx<e>: John likes x<e>] = himself
b. => John likes himself
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3 Semantics of the Construction
3.1 Outline of the general idea
I now outline a precise implementation of the proposal in terms of equations of
clauses. Given the present analysis, be must mean identity, and the post-copular element must
denote a proposition, which we equate to a set of possible worlds. In case the sentence was
‘What John likes is John likes himself‘, this yields as a first approximation (to be refined):
(41)  [[John likes himself]]={w’: John likes John in w’}
 All that remains to be determined, then, is the semantic contribution of the pre-copular
question. There are currently two main approaches to the semantics of questions.
(i) According to the Karttunen/Hamblin line, the denotation of a question is a set of true or
possible answers, i.e. a set of propositions.  From our perspective this yields an immediate
problem, since a set of propositions cannot be equated to a proposition without creating a
type mismatch. There are two potential solutions to this problem.
a. First, we could stipulate that an answerhood operator Ans is introduced in the logical form,
roughly along the following lines:
(42) a. What John likes is John likes himself
b. Ans(What John likes)=John likes himself
‘The unique exhaustive answer to ‘What does John like?’ is ‘John likes himself’’
                                                                                                                                                        
What triggers this transformation is the entailment relation between a. and b. Heycock & Kroch could observe
that Kaplan's semantics for Quantifying In makes (i)a and (i)b non-equivalent when they are embedded under an
attitude operator. Consider the following variant:
(ii) a. Sam thinks that what Mary shot/aimed at is her.
a'. ∃α ∃β (R(α,[what Mary shot/aimed at
 k, Sam) & R(β,Mary, Sam) & Sam thinks α= β 
b. Sam thinks that Mary shot/aimed at herself
b'. ∃α (R(α,Mary, Sam) & Sam thinks α shot herself)
It is clear that b'. isn't entailed by a'. This is, among others, because the predicate 'shot' has no choice but to be
interpreted in the scope of the attitude operator in(ii)b, whereas it may be read as part of a De Re description in
(ii)a. Thus if the computation of ι-conversion is allowed to be non-local, and to take into account the effects of
Kaplan's analysis of Quantifying In, Heycock & Kroch can predict that connectivity effects should be obviated
in attitude reports. In other words, if one is willing to countenance ι-conversion in the first place, the above facts
can be explained without resorting to the Question in Disguise Theory. (I leave it open how Heycock & Kroch
would account for unembedded examples, where connectivity can also be obviated under 'mistaken identity'
readings.)
Consider now Sharvit's theory. Her analysis could go along the following lines, as suggested in her
1999 paper. The crucial point is that as soon as 'herself' in a. is interpreted as the identity function (type <e, e>),
'her lawyer' cannot be referential (type <e>), for this would yield a type-mismatch. Hence 'her lawyer' must be
interpreted as referring to a natural function rather than to an entity. But this should block any 'mistaken identity'
reading; in particular, Kaplan's recipe for Quantifying In should become inapplicable.
(iii) a. Sam thinks that her lawyer is herself       => no 'mistaken identity' reading
a'. ... [ιf: f is a natural function & f(Mary)=lawyer(Mary)] = [λx x]
b. Sam thinks that her lawyer is her        => 'mistaken identity' reading
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The Answerhood operator is thus used to solve the type mismatch and to yield the correct
semantics. While such an operator is indeed used (in the meta-language) in the literature on
questions (e.g. Heim 1994, Beck & Rullmann 1999), it is normally assumed that  it is
introduced by the lexical semantics of the embedding verb20. But there is no independent
reason to assume that the semantics of be is defined in terms of the Answerhood operator,
and thus this solution is stipulative.
b. We could assume instead that because of the type mismatch it is not the denotation of the
question [[Q]](w), i.e. a set of propositions, that gets equated with the elided answer, but
rather the conjunction of the propositions in [[Q]](w) (i.e. ∩[[Q]](w)). This solution, which
solves the type mismatch problem, is implemented in Appendix I, with the surprising result
that modulo a mild constraint on the structure of possible worlds it does yield the correct
truth-conditions. But it is unclear why ∩[[Q]](w) rather than simply [[Q]](w) should be
computed when a question appears in an identity sentence, and we are thus left with an
unpleasant stipulation.
(ii) A more elegant solution is available if one adopts Groenendijk & Stokhof’s semantics for
questions, according to which the extension of a question is a proposition rather than a set of
propositions. The type mismatch problem does not arise on this theory, and furthermore it
can be shown that precisely the correct semantics can be predicted for the construction, as is
done in the next two sub-sections. Of course there are other differences between the
Groenendijk & Stokhof and the Karttunen/Hamblin approach to questions, and in the end the
present theory should be assessed within this larger debate (for instance Heim 1994 and Beck
& Rullmann 1999 argue that a version of the Karttunen approach can more readily account
for the whole range of exhaustive readings of questions than the Groenendijk & Stokhof
approach). The issue is not whether the present approach can be adapted to any theory of
questions - it can, but the question is how many stipulations one needs to do so. I’d suggest
that remarkably few are needed on the Groenendijk & Stokhof analysis.
3.2 Solution with a Groenendijk & Stokhof semantics
 In Groenendijk and Stokhof's semantics, the denotation of a question [[Q]](w) is the
unique exhaustive true answer to Q in the world w.  For example, suppose that we are in a
world where John likes Mary and nobody (or nothing) else. Then the exhaustive answer to
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 For instance Heim 1994  claims that the lexical semantics of ‘know’ must be defined in terms of this operator
(for her, to know Q [e.g. to know who left] is to believe that the answer to Q is what it really is).
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‘What does John like’ in our world is: ‘John likes Mary’ (and only Mary). And since a
proposition is a set of possible worlds, we obtain the following value for the question:
(43)  Value of [[What does John like?]] at a world w such that John likes Mary and nothing
else in w: [[what does John like?]](w) = {w’: {x: John likes x in w’}={Mary}}
Now suppose that in our world w John likes John and nothing else; then clearly the value of
‘What does John like’ at w will now be that ‘John likes John and nobody else’ - in other
words, the answer is whatever is true in the actual world:
(44) Value of [[What does John like?]] at a world w such that John likes John and nothing
else in w: [[what does John like?]](w) = {w’: {x: John likes x in w’}={John}}
In general, then, the meaning of the question evaluated at any world w should be as follows:
(45)  [[What does John like?]](w) = {w’: {x: John likes x in w’}={x: John likes x in w}}
We can now equate without any type-mismatch the extension of a question to the intension of
its answer21:
(46) Semantics for ‘[What John likes] is [John likes himself]’ (first attempt)
 [[What Johni likes is himselfi]](w)=1 iff
 {w’:{x: John likes x in w’}={x: John likes x in w}} ={w’: John likes John in w’}
Does this yield the right truth-conditions? Not yet. To see this, consider the following
scenario, where w is the actual world, and w1 and w2 are unactualized possible worlds:
(47) w: John likes himself and nothing else
w1: John likes himself, and John also likes Mary
w2: John likes Mary and nothing else
Intuitively, ‘What John likes is himself’ should be true in such a situation. But in this
situation w does not satisfy the above equation, since if there are no other possible worlds, we
have: {w’:{x: John likes x in w’}={x: John likes x in w}} = {w}
On the other hand: {w’: John likes John in w’} = {w, w1}
Since {w} ≠ {w, w1}, ‘What John likes is himself’ is incorrectly predicted to be false.
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 This might prima facie appear to contradict our earlier claim that what gets equated in a specificational
sentence is an indirect question and an indirect answer - which suggests that the first element should, just like
the second, denote an intension; this would yield a type-mismatch between <s, <s,t>> and <s,t>.  But in fact
there is no reason to assume that the denotation of an indirect question is necessarily an intension. As noted by
Groenendijk & Stokhof (1990), the opposite appears to be true with verbs like ‘know’ or ‘tell’ (as opposed to
‘wonder’ or ‘guess’), whose entailments require an analysis like (i) below:
 ‘Verbs like know and tell are extensional in the sense that they take the extension of an embedded
interrogative as argument. Verbs like wonder and guess  are intensional,  they essentially take the
intension of an embedded interrogative as argument.
(i) a. John knows whether Mary walks.
b. know(i) (j, λj [walk(i)(m) = walk (j)(m)])
(ii) a. John wonders whether Mary walks
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There is a solution, however. Let us stipulate that the answer, just as the question,
must be read as exhaustive (the stipulation will be derived shortly). We obtain the following
equation, which does yield the correct truth-conditions:
(48) a. [[John likes himself]]={w’: John likes John in w’}
b.  [[John likes [himself]F]]={w’: {x: John likes x in w’}={John}}
(49)  Semantics for ‘[What John likes] is [John likes himself]’ (second attempt)
  [[What Johni likes is himselfi]](w)=1 iff
      {w’: {x: John likes x in w’}={x: John likes x in w}}
= {w’: {x: John likes x in w’} ={John}}
Given that the first member of the equation is formally identical to its second member, except
for {x: John likes x in w} vs. {John}, the solution is:
(50)  [[What Johni likes is himselfi]](w)=1 iff {x: John likes x in w}={John}22.
In other words, ‘What John likes is himself’ is true at w just in case John likes John and
nothing / nobody else in w - the correct result. Interestingly, this derives the semantics that
Higgins had suggested on intuitive grounds in an addition to his dissertation:
“(1) What we saw in the park was a man and a woman
Why, on the specificational reading, does this sound like a listing? And why do we not seem to be
saying anything ABOUT a certain object or certain objects seen in the park -- compare the
predicational reading, where we are attributing a complex property to an object seen in the park?
An adequate semantic representation should at least account for these impressions. I suggest that
the following kind of representation covers these, and should be taken as a basis for elaboration:
(2) {x: we saw x in the park} = {a man, a woman}”(‘Remarks to Chapters Two and Four’, 1976)23
3.3 Exhaustivity and the incremental computation of implicatures
Let us now go back to our stipulation that the answer should be read as exhaustive. Can
this point be derived? First, let us observe that in discourse an implicature of exhaustiveness
is certainly present in question-answer pairs:
(51) Who did Mary meet? -JohnF
a. Assertion: Mary met John
b. Implicature: Mary met no one but John.
                                                                                                                                                        
b. wonders(i)(j, λi λj[walk(i)(m) = walk (j)(m)])’ [(G&S 1990), pp. 1–7]
22
 More precisely:
(i) If {x: John likes x in w}={John} holds, then clearly the equality in (49) holds as well.
(ii) Now suppose that the equality holds. Clearly, the actual world w belongs to the set {w’: {x: John likes x in
w’}={x: John likes x in w}}. But since by hypothesis the equality in (49) holds, w must also belong to the set
{w’: {x: John likes x in w’} ={John}}  But this means that w is such that {x: John likes x in w}={John} -which
is what we wanted to prove.
23
 More work is needed to determine whether and how our semantics can be extended to cases of quantification
into question - for instance the following:
(i) What everyone did was call his mother.
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The same is probably true in out-of-the-blue contexts if John is focused:
(52) Mary met JohnF
a. Assertion: Mary met John
b. Implicature: Mary met no one but John
But by itself the implicature won't suffice in the case of connectivity sentences, since
it is crucial that the exhaustiveness be built into the answer before the latter is equated to the
question. Otherwise we will be back to the first attempt that was outlined above, and we will
not derive the correct truth-conditions for the construction.  Interestingly, however, there are
recent arguments that suggest that the computation of implicatures must be done hand-in-
hand with the semantics. This is the proposal put forth in Chierchia 2000, who suggests that
each constituent has a normal semantic value and a 'strengthened' value, which is obtained for
each constituent by adding the relevant implicatures (if any) to the normal semantic value. In
a nutshell, we will suggest that the elements that are equated in connectivity sentences are
strengthened rather than normal semantic values. The strengthened semantic value of a
(Groenendijk & Stokhof-style) question is presumably its normal value; but the strengthened
value of the answer certainly includes the implicature of exhaustivity.
Let us first consider Chierchia's own examples. As is well-known, <some, every/all>
is a scale which triggers implicatures. 'Some student is waiting for John' implicates that not
all students are. For if I knew that all of them are, it would be more informative and hence
more cooperative to say 'Every student is waiting for John'.  By Gricean reasoning, if I do not
utter the strengthened sentence, this must be because it is false ((53)c):
(53) a. Some student  is waiting for John
b. Assertion: [∃x: student(x)] is-waiting(x, John)
c. Implicature:¬[∀x: student(x)] is-waiting(x, John)
Traditionally, implicatures are taken to be computed globally. In other words, an
implicature is computed by taking the negation of an entire sentence in which the scalar term
(here some) has been replaced by its alternative (every). But as Chierchia points out this
global procedure makes incorrect predictions in more complex cases (Chierchia's (12)-(14)):
(54) a. John believes that some student is waiting for him.
b. Predicted implicature: It is not the case that John believes that every student is
waiting for him.
c. Actual implicature: John believes that not every student is waiting for him.
If implicatures are computed globally, Chierchia observes, the Gricean reasoning that was
sketched above predicts the implicature in (54)b. But this is too weak: b. 'merely says that it
is compatible with John's belief that not every student is waiting. But this doesn't mean he
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excludes such a possibility', as is in fact understood (Chierchia 2000 p. 5).
Chierchia's solution is to allow implicatures to be computed locally. This is done by
defining recursively a strengthened value for each constituent, which corresponds to the
conjunction of the normal value and of the implicature. Thus the strengthened value of (53)a
is the conjunction of (53)b and (53)c. In simple cases of composition, such as (54)a, the
strengthened value of the entire constituent (here: of the entire sentence) is obtained by
applying the functor (here: belief operator) to the strengthened value of its argument (here:
the embedded clause). This yields the following results, which derive the correct implicature
for the sentence:
(55) a. John believes that some student is waiting for him.
b. Normal value: John believes that [∃x: student(x)] is-waiting(x, John)
c. Strengthened value: John believes that [[∃x: student(x)] is-waiting(x, John)
& ¬[∀x: student(x)] is-waiting(x, John)]
Using Chierchia's account, we can stipulate that in a connectivity sentence the
strengthened value of the elided answer is equated to that of the concealed question. Since an
answer with a focused element has an implicature of exhaustivity, this does derive the result
we need. But is there independent evidence that strengthened rather than normal values are
equated in identity sentences? This is by no means trivial since in Chierchia's system
strengthened values only give rise to implicatures, never to assertions. But we need to use the
strengthened value in the assertion part of an identity sentence, or else the equation we need
will not have the correct truth-conditions, as was demonstrated in (47).  So we definitely need
some independent evidence that strengthened values can be equated in the semantics. That
this is a possibility is suggested by (56)a , which has a reading (maybe its only reading)
which is definitely true:
(56) a. To eat five apples is to eat at least five and no more than five apples
b. # λx [≥5y: apple(y)]eat(x,y)=λx [[≥5y: apple(y)] eat(x, y) & [≤5y: apple(y)]eat(x,y)]
If only normal values could be used in the computation of (the normal value of) the equation,
the truth-conditions in b. would be predicted (on the standard assumption that 'five apples' is
semantically 'at least five apples', and that the 'exactly' reading is derived as a scalar
implicature). But b. is false, and of course conjoining b. with any implicature one cares to
choose won't help, for the conjunction will be false as well.  So a. should be false, contrary to
fact. No such problem arises if the strengthened values of the elements are equated in a. In
this case the scalar implicature in the pre-copular element makes the identity  a tautology, just
as one wants.
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Going back to our problem, What John likes is himself can now receive the following
treatment. The strengthened value of what John likes is equated to the strengthened value of
John likes himselfF. The former is identical to its normal Groenendijk & Stokhof value, i.e.
{w’: {x: John likes x in w’}={x: John likes x in w}}.  The latter is the result of conjoining the
normal value of the answer with its implicature, i.e. (semi-formally) {w’: John likes John in
w' & John likes no one but John in w'}. But this is simply the value of the exhaustive answer:
{w’: {x: John likes x in w’} ={John}}. As shown above, this equation of clauses yields the
correct truth-conditions.  I conclude that there is some evidence for a semantic mechanism
which, given the rest of our analysis, yields exactly the correct truth-conditions for
connectivity sentences.
4 Extension to DP Connectivity
Connectivity effects also arise with garden-variety noun phrases (Higgins 1976,
Heycock & Kroch 1999, Den Dikken et al. 2000, Sharvit 1999). Two cases should be
distinguished: when the pre-copular element is of the form D+N+CP (e.g. The person John
likes is himself), the sentence has a connected counterpart (here: John likes himself),  which
can be claimed to be present but elided in the post-copular position. In a nutshell, we will
tentatively suggest that in this case the spells out the definite feature of a concealed wh-word
such as who or what. Thus (57)a is analyzed as (57)b, by analogy with (57)c:
(57) a. The person hei likes __ is himselfi, *j  / him*i, j  / John*i, j
b. ?x [person hei likes](x)=he likes himselfi, *j  / him*i, j  / John*i, j
c. Who is the/a person he likes? -(He likes) himselfF.
But there are also  connectivity effects in the absence of any CP, i.e. without a plausible
connected counterpart:
(58) Hisi worry is himselfi, *j  / him*i, j  / John*i, j
The theory will be extended by positing that the noun worry has an additional argument
position in which himself can appear.  Although this hypothesis will be seen to be
semantically motivated (because ‘worry’ is semantically dyadic),  I do not have independent
syntactic evidence for it; in that sense this will remain a theory-internal assumption.
4.1 DPs as concealed questions
The facts we just laid out have been taken to argue against the Question in Disguise
theory because the pre-copular noun phrases do not 'look like' questions. But DPs can
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productively be interpreted as concealed indirect questions, at least in certain environments.
In my 1998 paper I cited the following examples, from Heim 1979:
(59) a. John knows the capital of Italy
b. They revealed the winner of the contest.
The relevant reading of (59)a does not assert that John knows Rome, but rather that he knows
that Rome is the capital of Italy; and (59)b is equivalent to They revealed who the winner of
the contest was24. However these examples don't appear to be entirely productive (e.g. John
knows your worry isn't readily interpreted as: John knows what your worry is). In addition,
Sharvit 1999, Cecchetto 2000, 2001 and others have pointed out that certain types of DPs that
can never have a question reading under such verbs can still appear productively in
connectivity sentences.
But the argument can be improved.  In French certain verbal constructions such as
s’interroger sur (‘to wonder about’) do systematically allow the following DP to be
interpreted as a question (much more productively than know in (59)a). This suggests that
DPs can by themselves be interpreted as questions, but only in a certain syntactic
environment S. We may then posit that in French the post-verbal position of verbs such as
s’interroger sur  and the pre-verbal position of copular sentences satisfy the environment S,
while in other languages only the pre-copular position satisfies S. This would yield an
account of the observed correlation in French, and of the known cross-linguistic facts. Of
course the challenge, which is left for future research, is to determine how the environment S
should be syntactically characterized - not a trivial matter.
 In French the same syntactic restrictions hold after s’interroger sur and before be in a
connectivity sentence: DPs are allowed, CPs aren’t. As a result, (i) an element can appear in
the pre-copular position of a connectivity sentence if and only if it can appear after
s’interroger sur. Furthermore, (ii) elements that appear after s'interroger sur can
systematically be interpreted as concealed questions. This lends further plausibility to the
Question in Disguise theory: whatever theory can account for the question interpretation of
DPs after s'interroger sur can be extended to connectivity sentences.
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 An additional argument (noted by Den Dikken et al. 2000) is that some DPs can be interpreted as direct
questions in discourse, and yield connectivity effects (Den Dikken et al.’s (145)):
(i) a. A: What is the only thing he didn’t do?
b. B: The only thing he didn’t do? Buy any wine
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Let us now consider the relevant French examples25:
(60) a. Je m’interroge sur ce que Marie refuse de faire
       I  wonder on it that Marie refuses to do
‘I wonder what Marie refuses to do’
b. Ce que Marie refuse de faire, c’est le moindre effort
     It that Marie refuses to make, it is the slightest effort
     ‘What Marie refuses to make is the slightest effort’
(61) a.  ??Je m’interroge sur qui tu as rencontré
     I  wonder on who  you have met
b.  ??Qui tu as rencontré, c’est Jean
         Who you have met, it is Jean
(62) a.  Je m’interroge sur la personne qu'il a rencontrée
I  wonder         on the person  that he has met
‘I wonder who you met’
b. La personne qu’ili a rencontrée, c’est lui-mêmei / *Jeani
    The person that he met,             it is himself   /   Jean
  ‘The person he met was himself / Jean’
 (60) and (62) show that DPs are grammatical after s’interroger sur and before be; (61)
shows that CPs aren’t.  But how can we show that the element that appears after s'interroger
sur can indeed be interpreted as a question?
(i) First, it yields opacity effects, as other clauses embedded under attitude verbs:
(63) a. Pierre s’interroge sur la personne que tu as rencontrée
   Pierre himself ask   on   the person   that  you have met
b. La personne que tu as rencontrée = Marie
    The person that you have met    =  Marie
c. [a & b] does not  entail: Pierre s’interroge sur Marie
Pierre himself ask about Marie
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 I have found one exception to the generalization, which I put aside because (i) it seems to involve a more
colloquial register than that of the cited examples, and (ii) the generalization can be saved by looking at slightly
different matrix verbs.  Here are the relevant facts:
 (i) a. Là où ili habite, c’est dans la maison de Jean*i, k
    There where he live, it is in the house of Jean
‘Where he lives is in John’s house’
b. ?? Je m’interroge sur là où il habite.
        I ME  ask         on there where he lives
There appears to be a dialect clash between ‘s’interroger sur’ and the expression ‘là où’ (I think ‘l’endroit où’
would be preferable in that register that uses ‘s’interroger sur’).  But the generalization can be saved by
considering a different embedding verb:
 (ii) Je n’ai pas la moindre idée de là où il habite
I NE have not the slightest idea of there where he lives
‘I don’t have the slightest idea where he lives’
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(ii) Second, these opacity effects cannot be explained by postulating that s'interroger sur is
an intensional transitive verb of the same class as seek, which also fails substitutivity tests.
For unlike seek (or its French counterpart chercher), s'interroger sur yields opacity effects
only when its complement is a definite. Thus the following pattern of inference involving
indefinites is valid with s'interroger sur but invalid with seek:
(64) a. John seeks a unicorn.
b. ≠> There is some unicorn that John seeks
(65) a. Pierre s’interroge sur une personne que tu as rencontrée
   Pierre himself ask   on  a person   that  you have met
b. => Il y a une personne que tu as rencontrée sur laquelle Pierre s'interroge
        There is a person  that you have met on whom  Pierre himself asks
The contrast between seek and s'interroger sur would be surprising if both were intensional
transitive verbs. By contrast, if only definite DPs can be interpreted as interrogative wh-
clauses, the contrast is unsurprising, and illuminating for our purposes since connectivity
sentences also involve definite DPs only26.
(iii) Third, the reason an overt question does not appear after s’interroger sur seems to be
syntactic rather than semantic.   In fact a nominal element such as ceci (‘this’) or cela (‘that’)
can appear after s’interroger sur when it refers to a question.  Thus in (66)a ceci appears to
be coindexed with a direct question, while in (66)b cela denotes an embedded question.
(66)  a. Je m’interroge sur ceci: qui as-tu rencontré?
    I myself ask on  this: who have you met?
  'I wonder about this: who did you meet?'
b. Pierre se demandait [qui tu avais rencontré]i, et moi aussi je
     Pierre was-wondering who you had met, and me too I
m’interrogeais sur celai27
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 There is one exception to this generalization. When the question under discussion is of the 'mention-some'
variety, which does not require an exhaustive answer (e.g. 'Where in the neighborhood can I buy a newspaper?'),
a connectivity sentence is possible, as in (ia) (an anonymous reviewer points out similar examples in English
with stressed ‘one’, e.g. ONE thing I forgot to do was bring any wine). The corresponding sentence with
s'interroger sur can to some extent have a concealed question reading, characterized by the failure of existential
exportation, as in (ib).
(i) a. Un endroit qu'ili aime vraiment, c'est soni jardin / le jardin de Jean*i
    A place   that hei  likes really, it is hisi garden / the garden of Jean*i
'A place he really likes is his garden / John's garden'
b. ? Marie s'interroge sur un endroit que Jean aime vraiment.
     Marie  herself asks on a place that Jean likes really
      ≠> Ily a un endroit que Jean aime vraiment sur lequel Marie s'interroge
    There is a place that Jean likes really on which Marie herself asks
I leave the topic of 'mention-some' questions in connectivity sentences for future research.
27
 Interestingly, the opposite pattern does not appear to be as readily possible. In other words, when a concealed
question appears after ‘s’interroger’, it is difficult to refer anaphorically to it in the complement of a verbe like
‘se demander’, which overtly takes an embedded question:
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myself was-asking on this
 ‘Pierre wondered who you had met, and I wondered about this too’
In all of these cases, then, it appears that the DP can be interpreted as an indirect question,
which defuses an important argument against the Question in Disguise Theory.  It should also
be noted that in the foregoing environments a question interpretation is available even for
DPs that do not contain a CP, for instance in the following example:
(67) Je m’interrogeais sur son problème le plus grave
 I   me asked  on his  problem the most grave
Reading 1: His gravest problem is x, and I wonder about x
Reading 2: I wonder about the following: What is his gravest problem?28
Finally, if the pre-copular DP is a concealed question, is there independent evidence
that the post-copular element is a concealed answer? The only argument I know of is that, if
ceci ('this') is used, a connected sentence can indeed be made to appear overtly:
(68) Je me suis longtemps interrogé sur [la personne qu’ili aimait]k, et j’ai
   I me am long    interrogated on the person that he liked,    and I have
 ‘For a long time I've been wondering about the person he liked, and I have
finalement appris que ck’était ceci:il aimait lui-mêmei29/??luii/*l’imbécilei/*Jeani
finally learned   that it was     this: he liked  him-self     /him/     the idiot   /Jean
finally learned that it was this: he liked himself / him / the idiot / Jean
Of course no such strategy can work in case no CP is involved, as in His worry is himself, for
the simple reason that his worry himself (without ellipsis of the first two words) is not
grammatical. This case is discussed at greater length below.
                                                                                                                                                        
 (i) a. Jean se demande qui tu as rencontré, et Pierre se le demande aussi
   Jean himself asks who you have met, and Pierre himself it asks too
   ‘Jean wonders who you met, and Pierre wonders about that too’
b. ?? Jean s’interroge sur les personnes que tu as rencontrées, et Pierre se le demande aussi
   Jean himself interrogates on the people that you have met, and Pierre himself it  asks too
I do not know why this contrast holds.
28
 We can strengthen the argument by showing that in one and the same sentence the same semantic element can
function as an embedded question after 's'interroger sur' and as the pre-copular element of a connectivity
sentence. As before we resort to question anaphora with anaphoric 'ça' [the facts are identical if 'la personne qu'il
aimait' (the person he liked) is replaced with a standard pseudocleft such as 'ce qu'il aimait' (what he liked)]:
(i) Je me suis longtemps interrogé sur [la personne qu’ili aimait]k, et j’ai
   I me am long         interrogated on the person he liked,    and I have
 ‘For a long time I've been wondering about the person that he liked, and I have
finalement appris que ck’était  lui-mêmei/??luii/*l’imbécilei/*Jeani
finally learned   that it was   him-self /him/ the idiot/Jean
finally learned that it was himself / him / the idiot / Jean
29
 'lui-même'  must be strongly focused. Otherwise 'il s'aimait lui-même' (with the reflexive clitic) is more
natural.
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4.2 Extending the Theory
4.2.1 The interpreted as a wh-word
When the DP contains a relative clause, the Question in Disguise theory can be
extended by assuming that the spells out the Definiteness feature of a concealed wh-word
such as what or who.  Thus the person John likes is analyzed as the indirect question who is
(the) person John likes, where the modified noun phrase is read as predicational. Independent
evidence for this interpretive possibility is provided by the DPs interpreted as questions after
s'interroger sur in French, and also by many other comparable constructions studied in
Spanish and Catalan by Hirschbühler & Rivero 1983, for instance the following:
(69) Acuerdate los libros que compraron  (their example (31e))
Remember the books that they-bought
'Remember which books/how many books they bought'
Hirschbühler & Rivero’s suggestion differs somewhat from the present one, however.
According to them the is simply interpreted as which, and is restricted by the head noun,
yielding for one reading of (69) Remember which books they read. As was observed by an
anonymous reviewer, this proposal would have undesirable consequences for the present
theory, in view of (70)a. For I wonder about the worst problem that John worries about
cannot be paraphrased as: *I wonder which worst problem John worries about. By contrast,
the analysis we are arguing for yields something like: I wonder what is the worst problem
that John worries about, where the definite description is read as predicational. This solution
can presumably be extended to connectivity sentences as well, maybe along the lines of
(70)b, which is constructed by analogy with the question-answer pair in (70)c:
(70) a. The worst problem that John worries about is himself.
b. ?x [worst problem that John worries about](x) = he worries about himself
c. What is the worst problem that John worries about?-(He worries about) himselfF
In (70)c the answer asserts that John worries about John, but it  also implicates that there is
no other problem that John worries about more (or else this wouldn’t be a satisfactory answer
to the question). How the implicature comes about is unclear (focus seems to be crucial); but
once it is assumed that such an implicature exists in (70)c, the mechanism developed in
Section 3.3 to equate the value of the pre-copular element with the strengthened value of the
post-copular element will presumably yield the desired results 30, 31.
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 The argument can be strengthened by resorting to propositional anaphora, as was done earlier:
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4.2.2 Nouns with an additional argument position
Consider now the case of simple DPs. First, I note that any theory that assumes that
connectivity really is about c-command must posit a further argument position deeply
embedded in the relevant nouns. An apparent alternative would be to posit that, say, in
‘Johni’s problem is himself’, ‘John’ is raised, yielding the following structure:
(71) 
        Johni
            ti's     worry      is       himself
But this won’t work. Suppose, as is plausible, that this structure is derived by an operation
such as Quantifier Raising, which is often taken to account for the bound reading in
‘Everybody’s mother likes him’. Then the locality conditions imposed on the antecedent-
anaphor relation by the Binding Theory won’t be met, as is shown by the ungrammaticality
of ‘Everybody’s mother likes himself’. So we need to posit that ‘himself’ can appear inside
the DP ‘John’s worry’, so that it can be bound locally by 'John'.
Once this assumption is made, we can show that the additional argument position
must be very low in the structure - a conclusion which is also natural given the dyadic nature
of the predicate ‘worry’. The syntactic argument is that the post-copular element must appear
below ‘unlikely’ in the following examples, or else the NPI ‘anything’ would not be c-
commanded by its licenser at S-Structure:
(72) The most unlikely (*likely) outcome is that we’ll do anything / we’ll lift a finger
                                                                                                                                                        
(i) In case you wonder about the worst problem that John worries about, it is this - he worries about himselfF.
Anaphoric it appears to denote the concealed question following wonder about, while cataphoric this would
seem to denote the last clause. Thus it is this does equate a concealed question with an answer. (Apparently the
last clause is degraded when he worries about is elided. I do not know why this is).
There is, however, a possible counter-argument against this entire line of analysis. One could object that the
acceptability of (70)c does not show that (He worries about) himselfF  triggers a certain implicature (namely that
there is no other problem about which he worries more), but only that question-answer relation in discourse can
be lax enough to allow for a very partial answer. This would make it impossible to construct a solution to (70)b
on the basis of (70)c.
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 If it can be fleshed out, this analysis will address an objection raised by Sharvit 1999, who claimed that the
present approach could not deal with a sentence such as The most obvious woman no man wants to answer to is
his mother. Sharvit’s point was that the Question in Disguise Theory could only derive the following, where Ans
is the Answerhood operator introduced in  (32) above:
(i) Ans(who is [the most obvious woman no man wants to answer to]) = [his mother is the most obvious woman
no man wants to answer to].
As Sharvit observed, this solution won’t do, since the right-hand side of the equation contains precisely the
connectivity sentence we started out with. However, following the question-answer analogy suggested by (iia),
we would analyze Sharvit’s example along the lines of (iib):
(ii) a. Who is [the most obvious woman no man wants to answer to? -(No man wants to answer to)[his mother]F.
      b. ?x [most obvious woman no man wants to answer to](x)=[no man wants to answer to [his mother]F]
The crucial point is that we allow for an answer that repeats only part of the question, as seems to be possible in
question-answer pairs in discourse.  This avoids the circularity that Sharvit warned against.
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Accordingly I posit the following structure:
(73) a. Pronunciation: His worry is himself
b. S-structure:
   ?x
         his is
             worry x         his
          worry   himself
c. Interpretation:    {w’: {x: problem(j, x) in w’}={x: problem(j, x) in w}}
                      ={w’: {x : problem(j, x) in w’}= {John}}
Although the tests above involve the dyadic noun ‘worry’ (x is a worry for y/x
worries y), it was argued in Schlenker 1998 that even prototypical monadic nouns such as
‘chair’ can cause connectivity effects. This created a serious type-mismatch problem for the
theory, which I discuss shortly. The relevant facts were as follows:
(74)  Context: John has a desk in his office, but he doesn’t have a chair. Thus, he uses his
desk as a chair (he sits on his desk).
a. *Hisi chair is Johni’s desk.
b. Johni’s chair is hisi desk.
Coreference is blocked in a, though not in b, which suggests that in the former case ‘his’ c-
commands ‘John’. The conclusion I drew in my 1998 paper was that all specificational
sentences can yield connectivity effects32.   
In the dyadic case (with nouns such as ‘worry’, construed as taking two arguments),
the theory didn’t encounter any serious problem. The structures that were posited equated a
question (hence the ‘?x’ operator) with an answer, and the semantic types did match, at least
on the assumption that ‘his’ somehow provides an argument of type <e>. To keep things
simple, I assume that ‘his worry’ can be analyzed ‘the [he worry]’, i.e. as [ιx [he [worry x]]]
                                                 
32
 Unsurprisingly, it was also shown that only specificational sentences could yield connectivity effects, which
accounts for the following contrast:
 (i) a. *Hisi problem is Johni’s arrogance.
b. Hisi arrogance is Johni’s problem.
The word ‘problem’ can be predicated of ‘his arrogance’ in b. (somebody’s arrogance can be problematic), but
‘arrogance’ cannot be predicated of ‘his problem’ in a. (a problem is not the sort of thing that can be arrogant).
Consequently, there is a grammatical reading of b.  in which the post-copular DP is interpreted as a predicate;
but the predicative reading is blocked on semantic grounds in a.,  which forces a specificational reading.
Because connectivity holds in that case, however, a Condition C effect ensues, leading to ungrammaticality. It
should be noted that a similar point can be made about the ‘chair’ example above.  If we change the context, so
that this time John has a chair and no desk, and thus has to use his chair as a desk (e.g. he writes on his chair),
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or as [?x [he [worry x]]] (depending on whether the NP denotes a question or an individual)33.
A further natural assumption is that in the answer only the ‘he’ part appears, which yields the
following structures and types:
(75) a. His*i, k worry is Johni
b. [?x hisi worry x] isid [his worry Johni]
c.
         st
   ?x         st
         his    <e, st>    is       st
               e  worry x         his    <e, st>
             <e,<e,st>> e     e   worry   John
                                           <e,<e,st>>   e
By contrast, in the monadic case (with nouns such as ‘chair’), the structures ended up
being uninterpretable, independently of whether ‘his’ was given the type of an individual
(<e>), of an adjective (<e, t> or <et, et>), or of a determiner (<et, e> or <et, <et, t>>). In all
cases the difficulty was that ‘chair [John’s desk]’ was of the propositional type, which
blocked any further composition since no plausible type-assignment for ‘his’ was of the form
<st, X>:
(76)          ????
his  <st>
      chair   John’s desk
   <e, st> <e>
Although I still believe that these facts are real, I also think that the analysis I had
offered is incorrect, and that the type-mismatch problem can be circumvented. I would now
suggest that in all cases of noun phrase connectivity, the noun is semantically dyadic - even
‘chair’. The intuitive reason is that ‘John’s chair is his desk’ in the aforementioned context
means something like: ‘the thing John uses as his chair is his desk’, with no implication that
the desk really is (in an absolute sense) a chair. Thus I introduce a dyadic predicate chair(x,
y) (‘x is a chair for y’), and claim that ‘his desk’/’John’s desk’ appears in the internal
argument position of this dyadic predicate, as illustrated below:
                                                                                                                                                        
the connectivity effect goes away.  Changing the context has the effect of making ‘his chair’ referential, so that
a predicative reading for ‘John’s desk’ becomes available. And this obviates the Condition C violation.
33
 Such a treatment is sketched for individual-denoting descriptions in Heim & Kratzer 1998, p. 246.
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(77)            st
his  <e, st>
 e
      chair   John’s desk
   <e, <e, st>>     e
So construed, the ‘chair’ case reduces to the ‘worry’ case discussed above, which eliminates
the type-mismatch problem. Some semantic support for the present analysis comes from the
observation that it is no contradiction to utter the following:
(78)  John’s chair is this desk. But of course this desk is not a chair / is no chair at all.
While this should come out as a contradiction if ‘chair’ were monadic, the acceptability of
the sentence is unsurprising on the present theory: the first use of ‘chair’ is dyadic, while the
second is monadic. In effect ‘chair’ is ambiguous between chair(x) and chair(x, y)34. Thus it
is no contradiction for John’s desk, call it d, to satisfy chair(John, d) but not chair(d). If this is
correct, and if nouns that trigger connectivity effects systematically have this dyadic
meaning, the type mismatch will never arise, and one important argument against the present
theory will disappear.
5 Objections and replies: Anti-Connectivity
The Question in Disguise Theory has recently come under attack on the basis of cases
of 'anti-connectivity', that is, connectivity sentences which (a) have a connected counterpart,
but (b)  whose connected counterpart displays different syntactic properties from the
connectivity sentence itself (Eisner 1995, Meinunger 1997, Den Dikken et al. 2000, Sharvit
1999, Cecchetto 2000, 2001). They largely remain a mystery (but see Cecchetto 2000, 2001).
But these facts certainly do not refute the Question in Disguise theory, for the simple reason
that the same anti-connectivity effects hold in question-answer pairs in discourse. I briefly
mention the relevant observations.
-Locality with Conditions A and B: Sharvit 1999 shows that in some cases an anaphor is
licensed in a pseudocleft but not in its connected counterpart (Sharvit’s (78) and (79)):
(79) a. The person every professor / no professor thinks should get a raise is himself / ??him
b. Every professor / no professor thinks *himself / he should get a raise
c. The person every professor/no professor hopes his wife likes best is himself /??him.
b. Every professor / no professor thinks his wife likes *himself / him best.
Similar examples can be constructed with garden-variety pseudoclefts. The following are my
recollection of sentences that were mentioned to me by Jamal Ouhalla and Peter Hallman:
                                                 
34
 I leave it open how the ambiguity should be derived.
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(80) a. What John thinks that Mary likes is himself
b. *John thinks that Mary likes himself
It is easy to see that the same facts hold with question-answer pairs:
(81) -What does John think that Mary likes? -Himself 35.
In the DP case, the parallel with question-answer pairs is harder to establish. One could
suggest, following Den Dikken et al. 2000, that NPs can in some cases be used as
unembedded questions, as in the following examples (Den Dikken et al.’s (145)):
(82) a. A: What is the only thing he didn’t do?
b. B: The only thing he didn’t do? Buy any wine
If one is bold enough to follow this suggestion, the relevant parallel for Sharvit’s examples is
the following:
(83) The person John thinks that Mary likes? Himself, of course.
However, even if one does not accept that DPs can function as unembedded questions, there
is another way to make the same point. As was shown above, DPs can quite generally be used
as concealed questions. Here again, the parallel seems to function rather nicely:
(84)  I am wondering about the person that John thinks that Mary likes. Apparently, the
answer is: himself/ it is himself.
In any event, it seems that Condition A anti-connectivity holds in the same way in Question-
Answer pairs and in pseudoclefts.
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 The interesting question, of course, is why anti-connectivity should hold in this case.  Ouhalla (p.c.) suggests
the following answer.  As he points out, the Question in Disguise theory must posit phonological deletion of
part of an answer.  If only constituents are deleted, we are forced to assume that the unelided part of the answer
had to move before the rest of the answer was elided, as shown below:
 (i) himself [John thinks ti that Mary likes ti]]
The question is what sort of movement this is - presumably, an A’ movement, which in the present case must be
successive cyclic.  As a result, there should in principle be a possibility of reconstruction in the intermediate
trace position, just as happens with wh-questions quite generally:
 (ii) Which pictures of himself does Mary think that John bought?
Of course if this is correct other connectivity effects must be reanalyzed - an enterprise we will not attempt here.
Suffice it to say that this line of thought makes pseudoclefts very similar to clefts:
 (iii) It is himself that [John thinks ti that Mary likes ti]]
See also Den Dikken et al. 2000 (fn. 29) for further considerations on this kind of examples.
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-C-command with Condition C: Cecchetto 2000, 2001 discovered another intriguing case of
anti-connectivity, which he thinks involves Condition C of the Binding Theory. Here are the
French versions of his Italian examples36:
(85) a’. ??Ce qui luii a coûté cher, c’est la Toyota de Jeani
    It   which to-him has cost expensive, it is the Toyota of Jean
b’. La Toyota de Jeani luii a coûté cher
  The Toyota of Jean to-him cost expensive
'Jean's Toyota cost him a lot of money'
The interesting fact is that, at least in French, the same effect can be replicated with
Question-Answer pairs:
(86) Qu’est-ce qui l’i a ruiné?   -Sai Toyota / -*la Toyota de Jeani
What is it that himi ruined? -Hisi Toyota / -*the Toyota of Jeani
What ruined him? -His Toyota  / John's Toyota
Obviously these facts should be explained.  But since they arise both in question-answer pairs
and in pseudoclefts, it is hard to see how they could argue against the Question in Disguise
theory37.
-Weak Cross-Over: Cecchetto 2000, 2001 discusses further asymmetries between
specificational pseudoclefts and connected sentences, which he attributes to Weak Cross-
Over. (87)a-b is a French version of his original examples, which involve extraction out of a
PP; and (87)c shows that the same effect can be replicated in question-answer pairs in
discourse38:
(87) a. Ce qui marchait derrière chaque général, c’était son bataillon
It that  was marching behind every general was the his battalion
 What was marching behind every general was his battalion
b. ? Son bataillon marchait derrière chaque général
His battalion was marching behind every general
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 His original example was:
(i) a.*Chi loi vide è la sorella di Giannii
 
    Who him saw is the sister of Gianni
b. La sorella di Giannii loi vide
     The sister of Gianni him saw
   ‘Giannii’s sister saw himi’
37
 An anonymous reviewer suggests that following line of analysis. Den Dikken et al. suggest that the Extended
Projection Principle does not apply under elision (see fn. 40 below). Applied to (86), this would force la Toyota
de Jean to appear in the c-command domain of the clitic le, which in turn would trigger a Principle C violation.
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 Here are his original examples:
(i) a. Ciò che sfilava dietro a [ogni generale]i era il suoi battaglione
    It that  was marching behind every general was the his battalion
‘What was marching behind every general was his battalion’
b.   ?? Il suoi battaglione sfilava dietro a [ogni generale]i
        The his battalion was marching behind every general
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His battalion was marching behind every general
c. Qu’est-ce qui marchait derrière chaque général?  -Son bataillon
 What is it that was marching behind every general?  -His battalion
    What was marching behind every general?  -His battalion.
Obviously these facts should be further tested, in French, in Italian, and and elsewhere39.
-NPI licensing: For completeness, I note yet another case of anti-connectivity, which is
discussed by Den Dikken et al.  2000 [(31)], who point out the parallel with question-answer
pairs. First, they observe the following asymmetry between specificational pseudoclefts and
connected sentences (note that the asymmetry arises within Den Dikken et al.  2000’s ‘Type
A’ pseudoclefts, i.e. those that they do analyze in terms of question-answer pairs):
(88) a. *A book that said anything sensible about X wasn’t sitting on the shelf
b. ? What WASn’t sitting on the shelf was a book that said anything sensible about X
As they show, that the same anti-connectivity effect also holds with question-answer pairs:
(89) ? What WASn’t sitting on the shelf? -A book that said anything about X.
Thus this is yet another case of anti-connectivity that supports the Question in Disguise
theory40.
-Quantifier Scope: Finally, Eisner 1995, Meinunger 1997 and Sauerland (p.c.) noted the
following types of examples, in which scope connectivity fails to hold:
(90)  a. Some student admires every teacher
Reading 1:   [∃x: x a student] [∀y: y a teacher] (x admires y)
Reading 2:   [∀y: y a teacher] [∃x: x a student] (x admires y)
b. What some student admires is every teacher
Reading 1:   [∃x: x a student] [∀y: y a teacher] (x admires y)
*Reading 2: [∀y: y a teacher] [∃x: x a student] (x admires y)
Again the same effects hold with question-answer pairs as well (see also Cecchetto 2000,
2001):
(91) What does some student admire?  -Every teacher
Reading 1:   [∃x: x a student] [∀y: y a teacher] (x admires y)
*Reading 2: [∀y: y a teacher] [∃x: x a student] (x admires y)
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 Cecchetto 2000, 2001 explains these facts with the formal mechanisms developed in Chierchia 1993 to handle
Weak Cross-Over effects in questions. The paradox is that Cecchetto argues against the Question in Disguise
theory, even though his formal tools would yield a direct account of the same facts on the Question in Disguise
theory, as far as I can tell.
40
 In order to handle this asymmetry, Den Dikken et al.  in effect posit that the Extended Projection Principle is
a result of pronunciation, and that it does not have to be satisfied when the head of IP is elided (their (42)):
'Whenever Infl is elided (by Forward Deletion), the EPP is not in effect, i.e. the EPP holds only of IPs whose
head is not elided.'
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The conclusion, then, is that anti-connectivity effects do not argue against the
Question in Disguise theory. Quite the opposite: they strengthen the generalization that
specificational pseudoclefst behave almost exactly like question-answer pairs. But this, of
course, was just Ross’s original observation.
Conclusion
 While there is an intrinsic appeal to any revisionist account, I think connectivity is
one of those few domains where one might want to remain a conservative. The debate about
the validity of our c-command tests is certainly a healthy one. But I hope to have established
that the connectivity problem per se cannot be an argument for revising them, and that the
conservative approach outlined here has both a conceptual and an empirical advantage over
revisionist accounts.
First, the present theory accounts in one fell swoop (i) for Ross’s original examples
(e.g. ‘What I did then was I called the grocer’), where a question is explicitly equated with an
answer; (ii) for those cases that are successfully analyzed by the Revisionist account (e.g.
‘What John likes is himself’), and (iii) for all the cases that display intermediate degrees of
ellipsis (e.g. ‘Ce contre quoi j’ai lutté, c’est contre la guerre’). By contrast, a Revisionist can
only account for (ii) and has to posit an entirely different mechanism for (i) and (iii), which
yields a tremendous redundancy in her theory. In addition, the Revisionist has to explain how
the mechanism that generates (i) and (iii) can fail to generate (ii) as well - not a trivial matter.
Second,  the similarity between pseudoclefts and question-answer pairs was shown to be
extremely strong, and to extend to the cases of ‘anti-connectivity’ that have been discussed in
the recent literature - a further argument for the approach presented here.  Finally, I note that
the present theory leaves several questions open, notably: (i) how the semantics outlined here
can be extended to cases of quantification into questions; (ii) how the syntax/semantics
interface works for noun phrases that are interpreted as questions; (iii) why clauses such as
his worry himself, which are clearly ungrammatical when they appear overtly, should be good
under ellipsis, and finally (iv) why anti-connectivity effects ever arise, be it in pseudoclefts or
in question-answer pairs. I am happy to leave these problems for the Conservatives and the
Revisionists of the future.
Appendix I. A Karttunen Semantics for Pseudoclefts
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According to Karttunen's semantics, the extension of a question is the set of all true
answers to that question. Formally41:
 (i) [[what John likes]]s(w) ={p<s, t>: [∃d<e> [p(w)=1 & p=[[John likes t]]s[t->d]}
However in order to handle indirect questions under 'know', Karttunen suggests that 'Mary
knows what John likes'  is true just in case Mary knows the conjunction of all the true
answers to the question (this line of thought is developed in Heim 1994). This is defined as
follows, where 'L(j, d)(w)' stands for 'John likes d in world w':
 (ii) Conj([[what John likes]]g(w)) =∩{p<s, t>: [∃d<e> [p(w)=1 & p=[[John likes t]]g[t->d]}
=∩{John likes Mary, John likes John, John likes Sam...}
=λw'<s>∀d<e> [L(j, d)(w) ⇒ L(j, d)(w')]
Let us now suppose that in connectivity sentences be does not just equate the pre-
copular element and the post-copular element. Rather, it equates the conjunction of the
elements in the question with the answer (this, of course, is a stipulation, since there is no
evidence that in other cases identity be can compute such a conjunction before effecting the
equation).  This solves the type-mismatch problem that we encountered earlier, for the
elements that are equated are now both propositions. 'What John likes is John likes himself' is
thus analyzed as follows:
(iv) Conj([[what John likes]]g(w)) = [[John likes himself]]g
Replacing both sides with their values, we obtain:
(v) λw'<s>∀d<e>[L(j, d)(w) ⇒ L(j, d)(w')] = λw'<s> L(j, j)(w')
This can be expressed equivalently as (vi), which is easier to compare to the analysis given in
the body of the article, repeated as (vii):
(vi){w':{x: John likes x in w'}⊇{x: John likes x in w}}={w’:{x: John likes x in w’}⊇{John}}
(vii){w':{x: John likes x in w'}={x: John likes x in w}}={w’:{x: John likes x in w’}={John}}
Unlike (vii), however, (v)/(vi) is not immediately equivalent to the result we want,
namely that John likes John and nothing else in w, which can be expressed in the notation of
(v) as in a. or of (vi) as in b.:
(viii) a. ∀d<e> (L(j, d)(w*)=1 ⇔ j=d)
b. {x: John likes x in w}={John}
(viii) immediately entails (v)/(vi), but the converse is not true. The following situation is a
counterexample:
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 For perspicuity, I mix set-theoretic and lambda-notation.
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w:  John likes John and Mary
w
1
: John likes John, Mary and Ann
-The worlds w’ such that {x: John likes x in w’}⊇{x: John likes x in w} are: {w, w
1}
-The worlds w' such that {x: John likes x in w’} ⊇ {John} are: {w, w1}
In this situation the equation in (v)/(vi) holds, although (viii) is not true. Observe, however,
that the above situation is rather peculiar in that the set of possible worlds is extremely
impoverished. In particular, there is no world in which John likes John and nothing else - a
surprising fact, for certainly such a world is logically coherent. Interestingly, as soon as we
assume that there is in fact such a possible world, counterexamples such as the one we just
discussed are blocked, and (v)/(vi) turns out to entail (viii).
Let us assume, then, that there is always some possible world w* (though w* not
necessarily the actual world w) in which John likes John and nothing else:
(ix) Auxiliary assumption: For some world w*,  ∀d<e> (L(j, d)(w*) ⇔ d=j)
When (ix) holds, (v)/(vi) does entail (viii). To see this, apply both members of (v) to w*.
After λ−conversion, this yields:
(x) ∀d<e>[L(j, d)(w) ⇒ L(j, d)(w*)] = L(j, j)(w*)
By (ix),  L(j, j)(w*) is true, hence the left-hand side of (x) is true as well:
(xi) ∀d<e> [L(j, d)(w) ⇒ L(j, d)(w*)]
But by (ix) again this entails:
(xii) ∀d<e>[L(j, d)(w) ⇒ j=d]
To complete the argument and obtain ∀d<e>[L(j, d)(w) ⇔ j=d], note that w trivially satisfies
the left-hand side of (v), hence also its right-hand side, i.e. L(j, j)(w)=1. But by logic this
entails that: ∀d<e>[L(j, d)(w) ⇐ j=d]. Thus we have shown that (v) & (ix) entails (viii), which
is what we wanted. ❏
Appendix II. A Remark on Den Dikken et al. 2000
Consider the following paradigm, from Den Dikken et al. 2000 (their (15)):
(i) a. angry with himselfi/*himi/*Johni is what hei is
b. a unicorn is what John seeks
c. a picture of hisi house is what nobodyi bought
d. *any wine was what nobody bought.
Den Dikken et al. suggest that these facts prove the existence of two radically different types
of pseudoclefts. What they call ‘Type A’ pseudoclefts exhibit a uniform pattern with respect
to all c-command tests, and should accordingly be treated in terms of question-answer pairs
(as is the case in the present theory). By contrast, they think that ‘Type B’ pseudoclefts,
which exhibit connectivity effects for every test except NPI licensing, should be given a
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different treatment, maybe along revisionist lines. The rationale for their proposal is that there
exists a correlation between the environments that license a full answer, and those in which
an NPI can be licensed, as is shown in (ii) and stated in (iii) (their (10)). (iv) is Den Dikken et
al.’s summary of the main properties of each type of pseudoclefts (I have substituted my
terminology for theirs):
 (ii) a. What John did was [he bought some wine]
b. *[He bought some wine] was what John did
 (iii) NPIs are found in the post-copular element of connectivity sentences only where full-IP
pre-copular elements are licensed.
(iv) (A)a. Type A connectivity sentences have full-IP post-copular elements.
b. their post-copular elements may look smaller than IP as the result of ellipsis
c. NPI connectivity involves c-command of the NPI by (elided) negation in the full-IP
syntactic representation of the post-copular element.
(B) a. Type B connectivity sentences have non-IP post-copular elements
b. there is no ellipsis in Type B connectivity sentences
c. hence type B connectivity sentences do not feature NPI connectivity.
However there are some reasons to doubt that Type A and Type B pseudoclefts should be
derived from entirely different mechanisms.
1. First, such a proposal is highly uneconomical from a conceptual standpoint. It is hard to
see how whatever mechanism generates Type B pseudoclefts could fail to produce sentences
that are indistinguishable from a subset of the Type A pseudoclefts. This would yield a great
deal of redundancy in the grammar - not an impossible conclusion, but one for which one
would like to have considerable evidence.
2. Second, even if Den Dikken et al. are correct about the facts, the ungrammaticality of
inverted NPIs does not necessarily imply that Type B pseudoclefts are not transformationally
derived from Type A pseudoclefts. In fact one might expect inverted NPIs to be
ungrammatical if the inversion process is the result of movement of an element from an
elided answer to the pre-copular position, somewhat along the following lines:
(v)     Himself is what he likes tis he likes thimself
Since NPI licensing requires c-command at S-structure, ‘any wine’ should not be allowed to
undergo such movement.
3. Finally, I do not think Den Dikken et al.’s characterization of the facts is entirely correct.
As is shown below, it is in fact possible to license an NPI in a Type B pseudocleft:
 (vi) a. What he refused was to buy any wine
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b. *Any wine was what he refused to buy
c. What he refused was to buy any wine
d. ? To buy any wine was what he refused
e. What he refused to do was to buy any wine
f. To buy any wine was what he refused to do
 (vii) a. What he refuses is to cause any harm
b. To cause any harm is what he refuses
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